The application for recovery for personal use must be made in "good faith," and requires a showing that the landlord or a member of her/his family have actual intent to take occupancy of the unit. Thus:
• fact that other units may be available does not, in and of itself, demonstrate absence of good faith and does not serve to defeat right to recover unit for personal use. Schwartz v Seidman, 2003 NY Slip Op 51277(U) (Civ Ct, NY County 2003); see also Delorenzo v Famiglietti, NYLJ, May 1, 1996, at 30, col 3 (App Term, 1st Dept).
• where landlord was not able to establish that her son was in position to take possession of unit at time of trial, good faith was not established and petition was dismissed. Dusza v Rela, NYLJ, Nov. 8, 1991, at 26, col 3 (App Term, 2d and 11th Jud Dists).
• where landlord seeking personal use eviction failed to present credible evidence that she was acting in good faith, her petition was dismissed with prejudice. See Kamenoff v Ormaza, NYLJ, Nov. 1, 2000, at 31, col 2 (Civ Ct, Queens County, Katz, J.).KAMENOFF v ORMAZA
Petitioner commenced this summary holdover proceeding against respondent to recover possession of Apartment #3L (the "subject apartment") located at 30-52 23rd Street, Astoria, New York 11102 ("the building") on the ground that petitioners wish to utilize the premises for their daughter pursuant to Section 2524.4(a) of the Rent Stabilization Code.
Petitioners are the owners and landlords of the building. Respondents are the rent stabilized tenants of record of the subject apartment. Petitioner served a Notice of Intent of Non-Renewal of Lease dated September 24, 1999 which notified respondents that their lease would not be renewed upon its expiration on January 31, 2000. The reason stated in the Notice was that the owners need the apartment for their daughter, Teodora who is 18 and a part time student at Long Island University-Brooklyn campus (NY city). Thereafter, when respondents failed to vacate the subject apartment on or before January 31, 2000, petitioners served respondents with a Notice of Petition and Petition holdover dated February 4, 2000.
The Court conducted a trial that lasted two days. Teodora Kamenoff, petitioner's daughter, testified in support of the application that she is engaged to be married and is planning to marry in December, 2000. She testified that currently she is a student at Long Island University and works as a hostess. The witness testified that she wants the subject apartment whether or not she marries, because her mother's apartment is too small. Biljali Faik, her fiancee testified that he intends to live at the subject apartment when he marries.
Lilliana Kamenoff, the named petitioner, testified that she is the registered managing agent for the building in question. She testified that there is another apartment in the subject premises (1L) which is currently vacant which she intends to use for a day care center during the day and at night her son will sleep in it. Ms. Kamenoff further testified that this apartment (1L) became empty July 30, 1999 but she did not offer it to her daughter, who became engaged August 4, 1999, because she intended to use it for her son, who, she knew as early as January, 1998, would need an apartment. The witness testified that she currently lives with her husband and daughter in a two bedroom apartment which is not big enough for three people. The petitioner also testified that apartment 1L, which is designated for the day care center, is presently occupied by her son, Nick, who moved into the apartment in December, 1999, and for which he pays rent. The witness testified that did not apply to DHCR for Apt. 1L to be "exempt." Mrs. Kamenoff testified that she is also seeking apartment 2L for her own use. She further testified that in March of 1999 Apartment 3R became vacant and was rented in April, 1999.
Petitioner's son, Nick Kamenoff, testified that since December 1999 he sleeps in 1L every night and on weekends. He further testified that he pays $995.00 per month rent to his mother and the electric bill for Apartment 1L. Nevertheless, he is not registered to vote at this address. He does not possess a driver's license nor does he have a telephone in the apartment because he has a cell phone. Petitioner's son further testified that his checking account address is 41-20th Avenue, Astoria, Apt 1B, which is a basement apartment and he simply uses it as a mailing address. Nick Kamenoff further testified that he works weekends and at night he takes courses at Baruch College.
Respondent, Lady Ormaza, testified that she has lived in the same apartment for 27 years with her husband and her son. She stated that the first floor apartment, 1L, is vacant and has been since October or November of 1999. She testified she has never seen the landlord's son in apartment 1L. She stated that she only saw the landlord's son in the building when he came with his father last year to fix something. Respondent offered into evidence a photo of the entrance to Apt 1L depicting a sign saying "Office" on the entrance door (Respondent's "A" & "B" in evidence). Respondent also testified that new tenants moved into Apt. 3R at the end of 1999 and that apartments 1L and 3R were empty at about the same time. Ms. Ormaza testified that she was in Court with the petitioner about two years ago when the petitioner tried to raise her rent.
Rosa Ochoa, a friend of the respondent, lives in the basement at the subject premises for the last eight years and testified that she is familiar with the petitioner's son Nick. She testified that he only comes to the building during weekends when something needs to be fixed, and he is always with his father. Ms. Ochoa further testified that she has never seen him in 1L at night or during the weekend. She stated that she sees petitioner's son about two or three times every two or three months and that she saw him for the first time by himself, the day before. The witness also testified that the only disagreement she had with the petitioners was about four or five years ago when when they tried to recover possesion of her apartment by alleging personal use.
Sandra Ochoa, a tenant in apartment 2L since 1991, testified for the respondent. She initially testified that before 1991 she had lived in another apartment in the building with her parents for 17 years. She further testified that she also never saw the petitioner's son, Nick, nor did she ever see anyone in apartment 1L since July, 1999 when it became vacant. Ms. Ochoa further testified that currently, she is being sued by petitioners in Housing Court because they are seeking her apartment. Her husband, Francisco, testified that he has never seen the landlord's son Nick in the building, let alone inside apartment 1L.
After consideration of the documentary and testimonial evidence admitted at trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. "Section 2524.4(a)(1) of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) exempts a landlord from offering a renewal lease to a tenant, and allows for the commencement of an action to recover possession upon the expiration of the existing lease, where the premises are to be occupied by either the owner herself, or her immediate family" (Schippers v. Mass, NYLJ, November 4, 1998, at 29, col. 1 [Civ Ct, Kings Co., Rodriguez, J.]). "Exclusion of a tenant from possession is counter to the purpose of the rent laws (i.e. 9 New York Code of Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) §2524.4(a) [New York City Rent Stabilization Code (NYC RSC)]; New York City Administrative Code (NYC Admin Code) §26-511(c)(9)(b) [New York City Rent Stabilization Law (NYC RSL)] where an owner seeks to recover possession for his or her personal use and occupancy. Therefore such provision is construed strictly" (Rudd v. Devine, NYLJ, February 11, 1998, at 26, col 4, [Civ Ct NY Co., Ryp, J.] citing Sommer v. NYCCAB, 93AD2d 481 [1st Dept 1983] aff'd 61 NY2d [1984]). Although the present Rent Stabilization Code does not explicitly refer to the term good faith with regard to recovering real property for personal use, case law interpreting RSC §2524.4(a)(1) has maintained this requirement for petitioners (Nestor v. Britt, 213 AD2d 255 [lst Dept 1995]). RSC §2524.4(a)(1) still requires such an owner to demonstrate good faith, but not a need for the apartment (Obloj v. Shaw), NYLJ, May 13, 1998, at 31, col 2 [Civ Ct Kings Co., Wendt, J]). "The purpose of the Legislature in establishing the Rent Stabilization Code was to prevent manipulations and to avoid schemes that are designed to circumvent the entire statutory scheme that was aimed at accomplishing a balance between good faith efforts of owners seeking living accommodations and tenants protected by the Rent Stabilization Law" (Samuel v. Ortiz, NYLJ, June 7, 1995, at 30, col 2 [Civ Ct, Housing Pt. Kings Co., Callender, J]). "If the owner who seeks an eviction can demonstrate that they have no reasonable alternative with respect to size, location or the clearly unsuitable living needs that their present apartment offers, then they have alleged circumstances that satisfy the "personal use" provisions of the RSC. However owners seeking personal use evictions bear a heavy burden of proof" (Samuel, supra).
In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances clearly demonstrate that the petitioner has not proceeded in good faith. The petitioner testified that she lives with her husband and daughter in a two bedroom apartment which she claims is too small. She makes this claim even despite the fact that at the time of the application she knew her daughter would be vacating the apartment they live in now. Petitioner's son, Nick, testified that he sleeps in apartment 1L every night yet he does not have a phone hooked up in the apartment and he receives his mail at another address. The petitioner claims she intends to use 1L as a day care center yet the apartment has a sign on it that says "office" and everyone concedes the apartment is empty at least during the day. She claims her son is paying her rent but no proof was offered of those payments nor did she register the apartment with the DHCR as exempt. Apt. 1L was available in September, 1999 when this action was commenced. Petitioner's daughter became engaged in August of 1999 but was not offered this apartment because petitioner testified that she knew her son was transferring from Monmouth to Baruch College in New York City and her intention was for her son to use the apartment. Her son moved into Apt. 1L in December of 1999 a period of four months after his sister became engaged and three months after Petitioner served the Notice of Owner's Intention Not to Renew Lease. Petitioner testified to the availability of Apt 3K within the same time frame. The Court finds that the owner had ample opportunity to move into these apartments but chose not to do so.
The Court finds credible the testimony of the respondent and her witnesses who testified that barring the times that the son of petitioner comes to fix something in the house with his father they never see him around the apartment building. Respondent's witnesses testified to various court proceedings in which the petitioner sought to either recover possession of the apartments or increase the rent apartments or trying to increase the rent.
Also relevant to this proceeding is "the 20 year rule" as it applies to respondent's tenancy. The 20 year rule is a provision found within the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (" ETPA") L. 1974 c. 576 §4 which in pertinent part states:
"Any provision of the regulations permitting an owner to refuse to renew a lease on grounds that the owner seeks to recover possession of the housing accommodation for his own use and occupancy or for the use and occupancy of his immediate family shall require that an owner demonstrate immediate and compelling need and shall not apply where a member of the housing accommodation ... has been a tenant in a housing accommodation in that building for twenty years or more. ..."
Respondent testified that she has been living in the apartment for 27 years, which means that respondent moved into her apartment in 1973. Tenancies that commenced as unregulated tenancies between July 1, 1971 and May 29, 1974, the effective date of the Emergency Tenant Protection Act ("ETPA") which was enacted to protect apartments that were decontrolled between 1971 and 1974) were subsequently brought under the Rent Stabilization Law that was in effect in 1969 (Rosenfeld v. Hall, NYLJ August 16, 2000 at 237, col 3 [Civ Ct, NY Co., Wendt, J]). The Emergency Tenant Protection Regulations (" ETPR"), first effective May 29, 1974 were enacted pursuant to the ETPA §17, L. 1974 Ch. 576 §4 (Id.). The ETPR §2500.4 contains additional protection for the tenant against eviction of a tenant of over twenty years based on a claim for use by the owner:
ETPR §2504.4(a)(2) provides:
"[t]he provisions of this subdivision shall not apply where a member of the household ... has been a tenant in a housing accommodation in that building, for 20 years or more ... ."
These regulations passed pursuant to the ETPA allow Respondent Ormaza to retain possession of the regulated apartment she has lived in for twenty-seven years. Respondent Ormaza is "thus in the diminishing class of tenants in New York City protected against eviction by owners who wish to recover an apartment for themselves by the prohibition in the ETPR, enacted under the authority of the ETPA. There is no conflict between the ETPR and the RSC. Rather the ETPR simply adds an important protection against dislocation of long-term tenants who have resided in their apartment since the period between July 1, 1971 and May 29, 1974" (Rosenfeld, supra). Thus, respondent's apartment is subject to and protected by the 20-year rule (Brusco v. Armstrong, NYLJ, July 12, 2000 at 28, col 1 [Civ Ct, NY Co., Lau, J]). "Simply stated the class of long term New York City tenants who became protected by the Rent Stabilization Law solely by virtue of the ETPA after moving into their apartments in the three deregulated years following vacancy decontrol, are protected by the ETPR from owner's use evictions" (Rosenfeld v. Hall, NYLJ August 16, 2000 at 23, col 3 [Civ Ct, NY Co., Wendt, J]).
For all of the above reasons, this Court finds that respondent Ormaza is a tenant protected by the ETPA and the rules legitimately promulgated thereunder (the ETPR), as a result of the fact that she became a tenant of the subject premises in the period between vacancy decontrol and the effective date of the ETPA (Rosenfeld, supra). Thus, Arturo and Lady Ormaza are protected against being evicted on the basis that the new owner wishes to recover possession of respondents' apartment for the use of the owner's daughter. Accordingly, this proceeding is dismissed with prejudice.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.
• evidence of "bad feelings" between parties was sufficient for court to find that good faith requirement had not been met. Fazio v Joy, 89 AD2d 604 (2d Dept 1982), affd 58 NY2d 674 (1982).
• good faith intention of first co-owner could not be imputed to second co-owner when the first changed her plans and tenant had not been notified of intent of second to occupy premises during window period. Caine v Carreker, 116 Misc 2d 419 (App Term, 1st Dept 1982). See also Powers v Babic, 143 Misc 2d 58 (App Term, 1st Dept 1989).
• good faith was not found where a landlord asserted that he needed the subject apartment because of his divorce proceeding, yet continued to live in the marital home and failed to take possession of any of four other vacant apartments in the building. Bourdouris v Caravella, NYLJ, Aug. 8, 2001, at 19, col 5 (Civ Ct, Kings County, Alterman, J.).BOURDOURIS v CARAVELLA
A trial was held in this holdover proceeding, in which petitioner Dimitrios Bourdouris seeks possession of the subject apartment for his own personal use. The respondent has resided in this rent stabilized apartment for 23 years. Both sides are represented by counsel.
Petitioner claims that he has been separated from his wife for approximately 2 years and that he has been living, in his brother's house on Staten Island and in his mother's apartment in the subject building. He states that he intends to live in the subject apartment, as it is located close to where his children live.
Pursuant to Rent Stabilization Code 2524.4(a), an owner may recover an apartment if he can establish a "genuine intention" to recover that apartment for use as his primary residence (Nestor v. Britt, 213 AD2d 255 [1st Dept 1995]). This intention "must be actual and genuine and not a subterfuge to remove occupant tenants, only to replace the premises on the market a short time thereafter" (Sobel v. Mauri, N.Y.L.J., December 12, 1984, p. 10, col. 4 [App Term 1st Dept]).
Petitioner does not have a written separation agreement with his wife. He has continued to live in the marital home for periods of time. He pays the mortgage on that house, he files his tax returns and receives mail at that address, and maintains the telephone in his name and keeps clothing, and belongings there. Respondent has called him during the summer of 2000 to complain about repairs and he answered the telephone at the house.
Petitioner testified that he remains on decent terms with his wife. On the eve of trial, petitioner filed for divorce. He did not provide a copy of the complaint. Pursuant to Section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law, since petitioner has not been living under a separation agreement for one year, his only cause of action for divorce would be a ground such as cruelty or abandonment. His testimony in this case would seem to contradict such grounds. Thus, it can only be concluded that the filing for a divorce is a sham, intended merely to bolster his position in the within proceeding.
Notably, petitioner did not call any other witnesses. His wife, a person most in a position to support his assertions, did not testify. Further, his brother and mother, who also have first hand knowledge of relevant facts, failed to testify. The Court draws a strong negative inference from the failure to produce these witnesses, as they have knowledge of material facts and would naturally be expected to testify on petitioner's behalf as to his current circumstances and his intentions with respect to the subject apartment (Leven v. Tallis Department Store, Inc., 178 AD2d 466 [2nd Dept 1991]: Jarrett v. Madifari, 67 AD2d 396 [1st Dept]).
The subject building contains 6 apartments, including respondent's and petitioner's mother's. All four of the remaining apartments became vacant during the period of time petitioner stated he was separated from his wife, and yet he failed to take possession of any of them. The failure to occupy the other apartments does not, by itself establish lack of good faith. However, it is a factor which may be considered in determining an owner's good faith intent (Reres v. Gabel, 19 AD2d 724 [2nd Dept 1963]; Basic v. Gabel, 21 Ad2d 874 [1st Dept 1964]).
Petitioner claimed he needed this apartment due to financial constraints of the mortgage on his house and expenses in running the subject building. Petitioner offered not one piece of documentary evidence with respect to his financial situation. Moreover, he failed to offer any explanation as to why this particular apartment was more suitable to his needs, e.g., size, layout, location, or condition of the apartment.
Petitioner bears the burden of proving, his intention to occupy the apartment himself, but his bare assertion is not enough. He must prove good faith by "a credible showing through objective criteria that [he] in fact intends what [he] proposes to do" (Asco Equities v. McGoldrick, 285 AD 381 [1st Dept 1955], affd, 309 NY 738 [1955]; Hickey v. Commr of Dept of Rent and Housing Maintenance, 58 AD2d 773 [1st Dept 1977] affd, 44 NY2d 879 [1978]).
"A decision on the issue of good faith must rest on an appraisal of the totality of the facts in the case" (Basic Holding v. Gabel, 21 AD2d 874 [1st Dept 1964]). Here, petitioner gave contradictory testimony during trial and at his deposition about the status of his marriage, about spending his free time working two additional jobs rather than with his children and offered no explanation as to his desire for the subject apartment in particular. Most notably, he failed to call crucial witnesses: his wife, his mother and his brother. The Court finds that petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a good faith intention to occupy the subject apartment as his primary residence. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
The parties should arrange with the Clerk of Part 18P for the retrieval of their exhibits.
A copy of this decision and order is being mailed to both sides.
• where landlord sought to recover tenant's rent-stabilized apartment for his son's use, good faith was established by genuineness of his desire to have his own apartment for privacy, its proximity to work, and overcrowded nature of his parent's house. The fact that other apartments had been available in building in the past did not undermine landlord and his son's good faith. Malafis v Shannon, NYLJ, May 29, 2002 at 23, col 4 (Civ Ct, Kings County, Marton, J.).MALAFIS v SHANNON
The court tried this owner's use holdover proceeding over the course of two days, January 24 and February 20, 2002 [FN1] . Post-trial briefs were filed and the matter was deemed submitted on March 14, 2002. After evaluating the testimony of the witnesses and the other evidence, the court grants petitioner a judgment of possession on the basis of the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The premises at issue is a two bedroom, rent stabilized apartment at 624 11th Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. It is located in a 17 unit multiple dwelling. Petitioners acquired the building nearly three years ago, i.e., pursuant to a deed dated July 23, 1999. Respondent is a 57 year old woman who has been a tenant of the premises for nearly a quarter of a century, i.e., since October 1, 1978. The rent reserved under the most recent lease, which expired on October 31, 2001, was $ 433.70 per month. Petitioners and respondent are landlord and tenant, the building is properly registered with the New York City's Department of Housing Preservation and Development, and the rents for the apartments in the building are properly registered with the New York State's Division of Housing and Community Renewal.
On July 16, 2001 petitioners served on respondent a notice dated July 13, 2002 stating that they would not renew the lease upon its expiration because they wanted "to withdraw the subject apartment from the rental market and use the same for the use and occupancy by their son, Nicholas Malafis, as his primary residence." Respondent did not move out when the lease expired on October 31, 2001 and petitioners began this proceeding the following month. A petition and notice of petition were duly served; the court file bears a notation to the effect that an answer was to be served by December 6, 2001, but no such pleading is in the file. Respondent appeared by counsel not later than January 20, 2002.
Petitioners have been trying for several years to obtain an apartment in one of their buildings for their son Nicholas. Malafis v. Evans, Civil Court, Kings Co., Index No. 52869/99, was an owner's use holdover that petitioners brought to recover possession of apartment C-1 at 325 First Street, Brooklyn N.Y. for Nicholas Malafis. That proceeding was dismissed by a decision and order (Sikowitz, J.) dated November 3, 1999 after a traverse. Malafis v. Evans, Civil Court, Kings Co., Index No. 51244/00, was an owner's use holdover in which petitioners sought anew to recover possession of apartment C-1 at 325 First Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. for Nicholas Malafis. That proceeding was dismissed pursuant to a decision and order (Marton, J.) dated June 22, 2000 denying petitioners' motion to strike one of the tenant's defenses. Petitioners appealed but the order was affirmed by a decision and order dated April 11, 2001 and petitioners' motion for reargument or, alternatively, for leave to appeal was denied by an order of the Appellate Term, 2nd & 11th Judicial Districts, dated June 28, 2001 (Malafis v. Evans, 2000 - 1441 QC). Two weeks later, petitioners served the notice of non-renewal described in the third paragraph of this decision and order.
Ordinarily, when a lease of a rent stabilized apartment expires, the landlord must offer the tenant a renewal. "[T]he right to a renewal lease is one of the cornerstones of the rent stabilization system," Caine v. Carreker, 116 Misc 2d 419, 420 (App Term, 1st Dep't., 1982). However, Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) 2524.4(a)(1) provides an exception for an "owner who seeks to recover possession of a housing accommodation for such owner's personal use and occupancy as his or her primary residence and/or for the use and occupancy of a member of his or her immediate family as his or her primary residence " The owner's intention to recover the premises must be genuine and the owner must be acting in good faith. Nestor v. Britt, 613 AD2d 255 (1st Dep't, 1995).
George Malafis testified that he wanted his son to have his own apartment. He testified that, including himself, there were a total of seven people living in the single family home where Nicholas was residing, that his [George's] oldest daughter also lived there with her husband, that she was pregnant, and that there would soon be eight residents of the home. He testified as well that it would take Nicholas about 5 minutes to get to work from the premises but that it now takes him as much as 30 minutes. Nicholas Malafis testified that he is 27 years old, that he wants to have his own apartment, that he has little privacy living under his parents' roof, and that he wants the premises as his own apartment because it is very near to his place of employment, to Prospect Park, and to a subway stop.
The court finds entirely credible the testimonies of George Malafis and Nicholas Malafis. The court is convinced of the good faith and genuineness of George Malafis' desire to recover possession of the premises for his son and the court is convinced of the good faith and genuineness of Nicholas Malafis' desire to have the apartment as his primary residence.
Respondent attempted to cast doubt on the good faith of petitioners and their son by eliciting testimony showing (a) that even though the premises is located in the back of the building, it is not likely to be as quiet as Nicholas Malafis expects because there is a courtyard in back of the building that is used by tenants of adjacent buildings and others for barbecues and parties when the weather permits; (b) that petitioners had not offered to their son any of the three other apartments in petitioners' buildings that became vacant after July 1, 2001; and (c) that the superintendent for the building in which the premises is located died in August 2001 yet petitioners did not offer the superintendent's apartment to respondent.
While the premises may be noisier than Nicholas Malafis anticipates, the court finds that respondent did not prove that either petitioners' or Nicholas Malafis' desire for the apartment was not or is no longer genuine. Inasmuch as petitioners have established their good faith and that of their son, the court can require no more. "The landlord complies with the statute's demands if he seeks the eviction with the honest intention and desire to gain possession of the premises for his own use." Matter of Rosenbluth v. Finkelstein, 300 NY 402, 405 (1950). The availability of the other apartments, even ignoring the evidence that three of them were renting for $1,600.00 to $2,000.00 per month, does not establish petitioners' lack of good faith. See, Matter of Campbell v. Reichman, 28 NY2d 950 (1971); see also, Matter of Berlinrut v. Leventhal, 43 AD2d 522 (1st Dep't, 1973) ("The owner is not required to occupy an apartment that is not controlled and thus diminish his income"); Parkash v. Barnes, NYLJ, May 11, 1989, p. 27 col 3 (App Term 2nd & 11th Jud. Dist.); Timko v. O'Mara, NYLJ, October 27, 1987, p. 16, col 3 (App Term 2nd & 11th Jud. Dist). The court holds that petitioners have proven their prima facie case and that respondent has not proven a defense.
The court is sympathetic to and troubled by respondent's plight. She has lived in the apartment for most of her adult life, and so far as appears, pays her rent on time and has otherwise been as good a tenant as a landlord might hope to have. Nonetheless, the court cannot close its eyes to the plain language of the Rent Stabilization Code. It is the province of the legislature, not the judiciary, to amend statutes so as to ameliorate harsh results such as the one required on the record here. Accordingly, the court grants petitioners a judgment of possession. The warrant shall issue forthwith. Pursuant to RPAPL 753 and so that respondent may find another place to live, execution shall be stayed through September 30, 2002 so long as respondent pays use and occupancy of $433.70 per month by the first of each month and so long as respondent pays by May 17, 2002 any arrears that have accrued to date.
The court attorney will mail copies of this decision and order to the parties, who are directed to retrieve to retrieve their exhibits from the Part O clerk by May 17, 2002.
• good faith was not found where a landlord sought recovery of a rent stabilized apartment for use by his son when: (1) the landlord had other space available in the building; and (2) there was past ill will between the landlord and tenant. Garner v Berger, 2002 NY Slip Op 50349(U) (Civ Ct, NY County 2002, Milin, J.).
• good faith not found where landlord ostensibly sought recovery of rent stabilized apartment for her elderly parents; parents occupied apartment of comparable size in same building, and desired apartment had network of interior steps between rooms which would not make life easy for her parents, given their disabilities. Raffo v McIntosh, 3 Misc 3d 127(A), 2004 NY Slip Op 50323(U) (App Term, 1st Dept 2004).